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RECENT DECISIONS

CoRPORATIONs-RESTRAINTS oN

ALmNATION

oF

STocK As

AGAINST

PLEDGEES WITH NOTICE-The charter and a by-law of the plaintiff corporation contained provisions which stipulated that before a stockholder could sell or
transfer any stock, he must first offer the stock to the corporation. The relevant
by-law appeared on every certificate of stock. The defendant Kiernan borrowed
money from the defendant corporation for which he gave a collateral note secured by the pledge of his-stock in the plaintiff corporation. The stock certificate
was delivered to the defendant corporation as pledgee. After the default of
Kiernan, the plaintiff corporation brought a bill in equity to enjoin the sale of
the pledged stock at 1auction under the power conferred by the pledge. The
trial court granted the plaintiff the injunction restraining the sale. Held,
affirmed. Since the main purpose of the restrictive stipulation was to prevent
undesired persons from gaining a right to share in the management of the plaintiff corporation, it was not the intent of those who adopted the stipulation that
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it should be circumvented by the device of a pledge and the subsequent sale of a
pledgee. Monotype Composition Co., Inc. v. Kiernan, 319 Mass. 456, 66 N.E.
(2d) 565 (1946).
In the absence of valid restrictions, shares of corporate stock are £feely transferable.1. The freedom of alienation of stock is an attribute which characterizes
the concept of corporateness. 2 Yet free transferability of. stock should not be an
end in itself. 3 Thus, reasonable restrictions upon· the power to transfer stock
have been accorded legal sanction.4 What is a reasonable restraint largely hinges
on the facts of each particular case. 5 Undoubtedly the law in this area has been
inspired in part by concepts which were evolved in the property field. Given the
premise that a share of stock is a property interest, the analogy that unreasonable •
· restrictions on transferability are unreasonable restraints on the alienation of
property in the estate sense may be too easily and irrationally drawn.6 Certainly,
the validity of restraints on alienation in this field should not· be determined by
reference to property criteria.7 Rather, the_emphasis should be placed on the fact
that an investor must be able adequately to dispose of his shares in order to proBALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, § 366 at p. 776 (1946).
STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 22, 23, 501 (1936).
8 Certainly, this problem is raised only in connection with small corporations. Unless one desires to "tilt with windmills," considerations which have to do with restraint
of trade or the public interest in the buying and selling of stock are unreal when applied to this area.
4 For a recent discussion of the tax consequences of restrictive stock agreements
see 60 HARV. L. REv. 123 (1946).
5 In looking at the fact situation to determine whether the restraint is reasonable,
factors which have been considered by courts are the size of the corporation, People ex
rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924); the degree of restraint on the
power to alienate, People ~ rel. Malcolm v. Lake Sand Corp., 251. Ill. App. 499
(1929); the right of the stockholders to determine who shall invest in their business,
Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 A. II8 (1924). Emphasis is also placed
on whether the control of the corporation is still in the majority of the stockholders,
Mason v. Mallard Telephone Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932); whether
the business is of the type which requires honest and skilled personnel, Casper v. KaltZimmers Manufacturing Co., 159 Wis. 517, 149 N.W. 754, 150 N.W. 1101 (1915);
whether the business is one in which an unfriendly stockholder might injure the corporation, 68 Beacon St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935);
whether the limitation upon alienation is necessary or convenient to attain the objects
set forth in the charter of the corporation, Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., l 7 Del.
Ch. 343, 152 A. 723 (1930). For a category of the varieties of restrictions upon transfers of shares see BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONs, § 336 at p.'776 (1946). For a collection of cases on the subject see 65 A.L.R. n59 (1930).
6 See for example the note in 42 HARV. L. REV. 555 at 556, 557 (1929) to the
effect that " ••. since shares of stock constitute no exception to the rule that restraints
upon the alienation of property are strictly construed, there should be literal compliance
with the terms of the power granted in order to affect the rights of subsequent transferees." Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N.Y. 516, 159 N.E. 416 (1927), and Dolph v.
Lennon's, Inc., 109 Ore. 336, 220 P. 161 (1923), and 2 THOMPSON, RE~ PROPERTY,
§ 1401 (1924) are cited in ,a footnote in support of the above statement.
7 But if a shareholder put a restriction on his shares, property criteria would seem
to be applicable.
1
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tect himself against the elements of loss and mismanagement. Is the restraint
such a severe b11rden on the stockholder's freedom of disposition that he has no
reasonable way out of the business unit? 8 But in this evaluation process one
cannot forget the fact tersely phrased by Justice Holmes that stock in a corporation "creates a personal relation analogous otherwise than technically to a partnership ..•• there seems to be no greater objection to restraining the right of
choosing one's associates in a corporation than in a firm." 9 The restriction involved in the principal case, its purpose being to control the personnel of the
corporation, should not be deemed a prohibition against the alienation of stock,
but rather should be characterized as a recognition of the shareholder's right to
transfer his shares, coupled with the restriction that if the shareholder wishes to
transfer them, he -should first offer them to the corporation. 10 While a few
courts have held such a restriction to be invalid, the weight of authority has
recognized that such options inserted in the, charter or by-laws 11 giving the corporation the first refusal are reasonable and legitimate. 12 The significance of the
decision in the principal case is that it tends to remove the dubious implications
sometimes expressed that such a restriction may not be effective as against
pledgees. 18 Yet, if the draughtsman of the articles or by-laws has adequately
performed his function, should not the question of whether the subsequent
transferee is a vendee or pledgee be immaterial? 14

John F. O'Connor, S.Ed.
8

For example, see the restriction struck down in Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons,
Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. (2d) 249 (1938).
9
Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476 at 479, 63 N.E. 934 (1902). Of course Holmes
was talking about small corporations.
lO STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 505 (1936).
11
It is said "that in absence of legislation • . . . a mere by-law is deemed insufficient to create a valid restriction, although if reasonable, such i by-law generally
will be given effect as a contract among the assenting stockholders.'' See 42 HARV. L.
REv. 555 at 557 (1929), and cases cited therein.
12
BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS 779 ( l 946). But the corporation must have the
power to purchase its own stock. State v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. 144, 244
P. 261 (1926). The Uniform Stock Transfer Act,§ 15 provides that there shall be no
restriction upon the transfer of shares unless the restriction is stated on the certificate.
18
See CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., 78 (1940). An examination
of the cases cited in Christy will reveal that they can be explained either by the fact
that the restriction was not printed on the cerificate or that the provision did not
specifically cover pledges--the courts construing the provision narrowly. The cases
cited in Christy involving this point and involuntary transfers are: People ex rel. Malcolm v. Lake Sand Corporation, 2 5 l Ill. App. 499 ( I 929) ; Magnetic Mfg. Co. v.
Manegold, 201 Wis. 154, 229 N.W. 544 (1930); Silversmiths Co. v. Reed and Barton Corp., 199 Mass. 371, 85 N.E. 433 (1908); Good Fellows Associates, Inc. v.
Silverman, 283 Mass. 173, 186 N.E. 48 (1933); Crescent City Seltz and Mineral
Water Mfg. Co. v. Deblieux, 40 La. Ann. 155, 3 S. 726 (1888); Barrows v. The National Rubber Company, 12 R.I. 173 (1878); Lane v. Albertson, 78 App. Div. 607,
79 N.Y.S. 947 (1903).
14
As such a provision is usually narrowly construed it would seem that the course
of wisdom in draughting would lie in being as explicit as possible.

